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Defining parody and satire: Australian
copyright law and its new exception
Conal Condren,* Jessica Milner Davis,† Sally McCausland‡
and Robert Phiddian§
The new exceptions to the Copyright Act in ss 41A and 103AA, providing
protection of re-use for ‘the purpose of parody or satire’ seem clearly
intended to provide protection for both parody and satire, not merely some
confection of the two artistic practices. As these practices are not contiguous
and separable genres, as pastoral and epic poetry, or situation comedies
and current affairs programs are, it is important to have a model for
understanding how these two practices can operate together and separately.
The threshold issue of what will legally qualify as parody or satire under the
new exception is critical in determining its scope. The answer to this
question will determine how far new forms of Australian artistic practice can
use existing copyright material before they become infringements, however
creative they are.
In Part 1 of this article, we argue that it is not safe to rely solely on dictionary
definitions of the terms, as the available definitions from the most commonly
used dictionaries depend on lexicography too completely shaped by
narrowly literary theories of the practice. Moreover, their definitions do not
take into account the sort of multi-media re-use that is most likely to cause
hard cases to come before Australian courts in the twenty-first century. In our
view this caution would be consistent with a judicial approach which surveys
a range of dictionaries as one element of the interpretive approach
supporting the primary task of textual analysis. Neither is it safe to simply
import the US jurisprudence on the terms, for two reasons: broadly, that it
has developed in jurisdictions with very different laws, especially those
concerning free speech, and narrowly, that the course of US case law has
generated a very idiosyncratic distinction between parody and satire which
may serve a convenient legal purpose in that jurisdiction, but which does not
correspond to the normal meanings of either term in Australia, among
practitioners, theorists, and (to the extent they think it through) audiences.
In Part 2 of this article (forthcoming) we develop a better theoretical
framework for interpreting and applying the threshold definitional part of the
new exception.
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Part 1: Why US law and dictionaries are unsound
sources
I’m not a lawyer, I’m a cartoonist. I poke fun at people for a living. — Bill Leak1
1 Introduction
In December 2006 Australia got a new fair dealing exception for the purposes
of ‘parody or satire’ (the new exception).2 In his second reading speech to the
House of Representatives, the Attorney-General said that the new exception
would promote:
free speech and Australia’s fine tradition of satire by allowing our comedians and
cartoonists to use copyright material for the purposes of parody or satire.3
The Minister for Justice told the Senate that the new exception would ensure
‘that Australia’s fine tradition of poking fun at itself and others will not be
unnecessarily restricted’.4
The words ‘parody or satire’ are undefined and the issue of what definitions
will apply is not yet settled. There was disagreement between copyright
owners and users on this issue during the bill submission process.5 It is likely,
therefore, that any test case concerning the new exception will involve a
‘battle of the definitions’, or rather of the range allowed by adoption of this or
that definition. The outcome of this ‘battle’ will be important. It will dictate
which kinds of creative expressions using existing copyright material can
claim threshold protection, and which will be knocked out of contention. The
definitional stage will act as a bottle-neck determining which creative
expressions go through to the substantive analysis of ‘fairness’. In the
meantime, neither parodic or satirical artists nor their publishers can know
what sorts of activities will enjoy protection.
Part 1 of this article examines two key approaches to defining parody and
satire apparent in the prior case law and around the introduction of the new
exception. The first is the ‘binary approach’ in certain US fair use cases.6 In
a nutshell, this ‘binary approach’ requires the court to classify the allegedly
infringing use of copyright material into one of two restrictively defined
categories: either it is a ‘parody’, a work whose main aim is to comment
critically on the original work or its author; or it is a ‘satire’, using the
copyright material to critique some other target. During the lead up to
introduction of the new exception, the US binary approach was promulgated
1 P Wilson, ‘Leak in the clear over Tintin’, The Australian, 4 June 2007.
2 Copyright Amendment Act 2006 (Cth) ss 41A and 103AA.
3 Commonwealth of Australia, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 19 October
2006, p 2 (Philip Ruddock, Attorney-General).
4 Commonwealth of Australia, Parliamentary Debates, 29 November 2006, p 112 (Chris
Ellison, Minister for Justice and Customs).
5 See further S McCausland, ‘Protecting “A Fine Tradition of Satire”: The New Fair Dealing
Exception for Parody or Satire in the Australian Copyright Act’ [2007] EIPR 287.
6 See, eg, Leibovitz v Paramount Pictures Corporation 137 F 3d 109 (2d Cir, 1998); Dr Seuss
Enterprises v Penguin Books USA, Inc 109 F 3d 1394 (9th Cir, 1997); Columbia Pictures
Industries v Miramax Films Co 11 F Supp 2d 1179 (USDC, 1998); Suntrust Bank v
Houghton Mifflin Co 268 F 3d 1257 (11th Cir, 2001), discussed further in text accompanying
below n 45.
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by interest groups seeking to limit the scope of any new exception to the
exclusive rights of copyright owners under Australian law.7 It is likely that, in
any test case on the new exception, the plaintiff will argue that the court
should adopt these restrictive US legal definitions of parody and satire.8
The second approach we examine is the favourite short cut to definitions in
Australian fair dealing cases to date — that is to define common words using
dictionaries.9 The Australian Macquarie Dictionary is usually preferred, and
is likely to be cited in any test case, so we will focus on that.
Using a range of examples, we examine the implications of each approach
for cartoonists, comedians and other creators seeking the protection of the new
exception. Concerning parody, we argue that the US definition is far narrower
than any ‘ordinary’meaning and, if used, could significantly narrow the scope
of works protected. We also test the application of these approaches to ‘satire’.
The Macquarie Dictionary definition is based on the classic Augustan, or
‘Pope and Dryden’, literary models, while under US case law, satire has come
to encompass a range of socially critical expressions.
We show how legal definitions canvassed to date may exclude expressions
which are both transformative10 and harmless — that is, uses which do not
substitute for the original work or otherwise affect the legitimate interests of
the copyright owner — and ones which ordinary people would today consider
to be parody and/or satire. Such a result would be unlikely to inspire
confidence in copyright law and may unnecessarily restrict creative expression
in Australia.
We argue that, while both the US fair use cases and the Macquarie
Dictionary merit review, in this new territory for Australia neither source
should control legal meaning. We suggest that a proper application of the rules
of statutory construction will favour ‘ordinary meanings’ discovered by
reference to a wider range of sources. This approach, which we explore in
7 See, eg, submissions to Commonwealth of Australia, Attorney-General’s Department, Issues
Paper, Fair Use and other Copyright Exceptions in the Digital Age, May 2005 (Fair Use
Inquiry) by the Copyright Agency Limited; Copyright Council (supported by Media
Entertainment and Arts Alliance; Viscopy and the National Association for the Visual Arts).
See further in McCausland, above n 5. For an earlier proposal in favour of adopting the
restrictive US approach in any Australian version of a parody exception, see D J Brennan,
‘Copyright and Parody in Australia: Some Thoughts on Suntrust Bank v Houghton Mifflin
Company’ (2002) 13(3) AIPJ 161 at 165.
8 This approach appears evident in publications by copyright owner groups explaining the
new exception to constituents. See, eg, Copyright Council, information sheet ‘Parody, Satire
and Jokes’, December 2006, at <http://www.copyright.org.au>: ‘It seems that the purpose of
a true parody is to make some comment on the imitated work or on its creator’; Australian
Record Industry Association, ‘Key Changes — Copyright Amendment Act 2006’, at
<http://www.aria.com.au/pages/keychanges-CopyrightAmendmentAct2006.htm>: ‘A
parody transforms and comments on the copyright material itself, whereas a satire uses
copyright material to draw attention to a more general comment on society.’
9 This approach is generally accepted in statutory interpretation in Australia, with the
Macquarie Dictionary being the first choice of most Australian courts: see D C Pearce and
R Geddes, Statutory Interpretation in Australia, 6th ed, LexisNexis, Australia, 2006,
para 3.30.
10 By ‘transformative’ we mean the sense employed by Souter J, delivering the judgment of the
US Supreme Court in Campbell v Acuff-Rose Music Inc 510 US 569 (1994) (Campbell)
at 579: ‘adding something new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the first
with new expression, meaning, or message’.
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Part 2, aims to ensure that, as far as possible, the legal definitions of parody
and satire reflect the familiar connotations of these terms relied on in informed
practices among those using the new exception in the spirit of Australia’s ‘fine
tradition’.
2 An interpretive framework
The new exception is found in ss 41A and 103AA of the Act, as follows:
41A Fair dealing for purpose of parody or satire
A fair dealing with a literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work, or with an
adaptation of a literary, dramatic or musical work, does not constitute an
infringement of the copyright in the work if it is for the purpose of parody or satire.
103AA Fair dealing for purpose of parody or satire
A fair dealing with an audio-visual item does not constitute an infringement of the
copyright in the item or in any work or other audio-visual item included in the item
if it is for the purpose of parody or satire.
Parody and satire are ancient critical terms which have accrued many
overlapping, and some contradictory, meanings over the centuries.11 It will be
neither possible nor, in the interests of expeditious resolution of litigation,
desirable for a court construing the new exception to seek to embrace all the
complexities of these usages. Of necessity, the court will adopt ‘working
definitions’ which will, to some extent, be reductionist. It is, however,
important that these definitions take in rather more than the ‘I find it funny, so
it’s OK’ test that most ordinary people very simply apply to parody and satire.
What is important is the objective purposes of the use of copyright material for
parody or satire. We argue that working definitions reflecting these objective
purposes require contemporary understandings of the rules of the modes, as
practitioners demonstrate them. This is not to propose that the empirical
intentions of individual practitioners should hold much (or any) value in
assessing whether a piece is parody or satire for the purposes of the Act.
Rather, we argue that what practitioners might reasonably understand by
parody and satire should inform the legal definition of each term and this in
turn, as we shall show, requires some attention to a more elaborate analysis of
the nature and purpose of these activities than the reasonable person can
simply intuit.
Nor is recourse to dictionary definitions necessarily safe, as parody and
satire are no longer confined to principally literary practices; indeed many
11 See S Dentith, Parody, Routledge, London, 2000; M Rose, Parody/Metafiction, Croom
Helm, London, 1979, revised as Parody: Ancient, Modern, and Post-modern, Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, 1993; L Hutcheon, A Theory of Parody: The Teachings of
Twentieth-Century Art Forms, Methuen, New York and London, 1985; R Phiddian, Swift’s
Parody, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1995; and ‘Are Parody and
Deconstruction Secretly the Same Thing?’ (1997) 28(4) New Literary History 673, for
surveys of and approaches to parody. For more recent surveys of and approaches to satire see
D Griffin, Satire: A Critical Reintroduction, University Press of Kentucky, Lexington, 1994;
B C Connery and K Combe (Eds), Theorizing Satire: Essays in Literary Criticism, St
Martin’s Press, New York, 1995; F V Bogel, The Difference Satire Makes: Rhetoric and
Reading from Jonson to Byron, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 2001; and C A Knight, The
Literature of Satire, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge and New York, 2004.
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hard cases presented before courts these days are likely to deal with digital
appropriation of sound and images. Standard definitions of the terms have not
yet taken full account of these major changes in the media of parody and
satire. If the provisions are not to be interpreted so as to freeze artistic
practices in the print age, definitions are needed which accommodate and
reflect how the forms are developing. Current practices of parody and satire
are not radically discontinuous from older modes of satire and parody; indeed
the continuities are very real and significant. However, if a ‘fine tradition’ of
parody and satire is to be protected, rather than fossilised, the law must allow
for technical and other developments within it.
In Stevens v Sony,12 a recent High Court case interpreting new amendments
to the Copyright Act, members of the court recited the following rules of
statutory interpretation as found in the common law and as codified and
extended in the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth). Stating first that the
structure and text of a provision were the overriding considerations, the
majority then affirmed that the dominant rule of construction was the
‘purposive rule’, now modified by s 15AA of the Acts Interpretation Act:
In the interpretation of a provision of an Act, a construction that would promote the
purpose or object underlying the Act (whether that purpose or object is expressly
stated in the Act or not) shall be preferred to a construction that would not promote
that purpose or object.13
The court also referred to s 15AB of the Act. This subsection allows the court
to consider extrinsic material which is:
‘capable of assisting in the ascertainment of the meaning of the provision’ to confirm
that the meaning is the ‘ordinary meaning conveyed by the text of the provision
taking into account its context in the Act and the purpose or object underlying the
Act’.
Section 15AB also grants flexibility of judicial interpretation where the
provision is ‘ambiguous or obscure’ or if the ordinary meaning would lead to
a result that is ‘manifestly absurd or is unreasonable’. Importantly, s 15AB
requires Australian courts to keep in mind ‘the desirability of persons being
able to rely on the ordinary meaning’ of the provision being interpreted.
In this article we proceed on the assumption that there is nothing warranting
the displacement of the ordinary meanings of parody and satire by, for
example, the binary approach to these terms under US law. A brief rehearsal
of the textual and extrinsic materials supports this approach.
First, there are no definitions of the words ‘parody or satire’ inserted into the
Act, and no limiting words within the text of the two provisions. The drafters
could easily have narrowed the definition of parody to the restrictive US
meaning by, for example, expressly limiting permitted fair dealings with a
work or audiovisual item to the purpose of parody of ‘that work or audiovisual
item’ only. But no such limiting words appear in the text, and so a parody
substantially reproducing a copyright work or audiovisual item could be for
12 Stevens v Kabushiki Kaisha Sony Computer Entertainment (2005) 221 ALR 448; 65 IPR
513; [2005] HCA 58; BC200507453.
13 Acts Interpretation Act, cited in Stevens (2005) 221 ALR 448; 65 IPR 513; [2005] HCA 58;
BC200507453 at [31]–[32] per Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ.
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the purpose of parodying that work or audiovisual item and thus commenting
critically on it, as per the current US legal meaning of parody, or, in theory,
would still be within the legislative purpose if used to parody something else
entirely.
Nor is any clear legislative intention to displace the ordinary meanings of
the terms apparent in the extrinsic materials. While comments in the Amended
Explanatory Memorandum, echoed by the Minister for Justice’s second
reading speech in the Senate, do suggest some reference to the binary US
approach:
Parody by its nature is likely to involve holding up a creator or performance to scorn
or ridicule. Satire does not involve such direct comment on the original material, but
in using material for a general point it should also not be unfair.14
But they do not do so unequivocally: parody is described as likely to involve
critique of the copyright material it uses, not that it must do so in order to fall
within the exception.
Further, and much more significantly, the inclusion — above the objections
of copyright owners — of ‘satire’ as a use now covered by fair dealing15
further distances the Australian text from the US binary approach. As
discussed below, under that approach, if the court determines the use a
‘parody’, it is presumptively fair and legal, but if it classifies the use a ‘satire’,
the use is presumptively unfair and illegal. By expressly including ‘satire’ in
the new Australian fair dealing exception, our drafters have rejected the US
binary approach, following instead the government’s injunction to protect
satirical use of copyright material as part of Australia’s ‘fine tradition of
poking fun’. Parody and satire (not to mention ‘parodical satire’) are on an
equal footing in Australian law.
Finally, brief reference may be made to the scant judicial comments on the
possible legal meaning of parody and satire in Australian case law. All
predating the exception are obiter and none had led to any specialised legal
meanings which could be taken to have informed the drafters’ choice of
words.16
The statutory presumption of ordinary meaning is also supported by the
context. Artists, social commentators, comedians and other creators will use
the exception to create new works. It is particularly desirable these users are
able to rely on ordinary meanings of parody and satire as they know these
terms in their work. These ordinary meanings should be current, relevant to
Australian legal and cultural conditions, and informed by a careful
understanding of how these activities are developing in practice. That is why
we argue in the next sections that it is unsafe to lock in other definitions
developed by the idiosyncratic course of US case law on the terms, or by
dictionary definitions which hark back to the Augustan age. If creators need to
14 Commonwealth of Australia, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 30 November 2006. See also
Amended Explanatory Memorandum.
15 This express inclusion of ‘satire’ is apparently unique in the world. For a review of criticisms
from copyright owners who opposed it, see McCausland, above n 5.
16 See eg, Conti J in TCN Channel Nine Pty Ltd v Network Ten Pty Ltd (2001) 184 ALR 1; 50
IPR 335; [2001] FCA 108; BC200100361 (Panel Trial Judgment); AGL Sydney Ltd v
Shortland County Council (1989) 17 IPR 99 at 105.
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get specialist legal advice on whether their works ‘qualify’ as parody or satire,
they may be discouraged from using the new exception. Given that its purpose
is to promote free speech, the new amendment will best serve the public
interest by applying legal definitions of parody and satire which track ordinary
meanings as understood by practitioners and their audiences as closely as
possible, and which are neither unreasonably restrictive nor dangerously
vague.
3 US fair use definition of ‘parody’
The US treatment of parody and satire has evolved in a particular legislative
and constitutional context which should caution against easy conflation of the
new Australian provisions with US definitions. On even a simple textual
comparison, the open-ended, flexible structure of s 107 of the US Copyright
Act17 is clearly very different from the new exception. The US law on parody
has developed by judicial increment under s 107 and has generated
understandings of the central terms parody and satire which, to put it mildly,
appear quite odd in an Australian context. Harsher critics might be inclined to
suggest that US law in this area is an illustration of opportunistic judicial
constriction of a relatively open statute, leading to definitions of parody and
satire which have become very hard to reconcile with either the scholarly or
the ordinary meaning of the words. There is no need to be persuaded of this
larger allegation, however, before reaching the conclusion that US law cannot
be relied upon to provide a neat ‘take-away’ set of definitions for the
Australian exception.
The US Act relevantly provides that ‘the fair use of a copyrighted work . . .
for purposes such as criticism and comment, is not an infringement’.
Section 107 then proceeds to list four factors to be taken into account in
assessing whether a use is fair. Because the list of fair uses set out in the text
of s 107 is non-exhaustive, the issue of definitions is, in that context, simply
not as crucial as it is for the new Australian exception. Under US law new
‘transformative uses’ can certainly be recognised as fair use, provided they
meet the s 107 criteria. The two statutory texts are of a completely different
structure.
Prior to the US Supreme Court decision in Campbell v Acuff-Rose Music in
199418 the US courts used the terms ‘parody’ and ‘satire’ interchangeably.19
This is not a conflation that any professional practitioner or cultural or literary
theorist would accept, either then or now. It confuses a fundamentally formal
category — parody, or the manipulation of pre-existing works, usually for
comic effect — with an essentially intentional one — satire, or the attack on
some irritating aspect of the world. What the conflation or interchangeability
of terms does seem to recognise, however, is an awareness that parodic form
and satirical purpose have frequently enjoyed a symbiotic relationship:
17 17 USC (1976) s 107.
18 510 US 569 (1994).
19 Eg, Elsemere Music Inc v National Broadcasting Co 482 F Supp 741 (1980); aff 623 F Supp
252 (2d Cir, 1980); Fisher v Dees 794 F 2d 432 (9th Cir, 1986) at 436. See further B P Keller
and R Tushnet, ‘Even More Parodic than the Real Thing: Parody Lawsuits Revisited’ (2004)
94 TMR 979 at 983.
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Jonathan Swift’s Gulliver’s Travels parodies travel books while also satirising
British politics and European civilisation; the contemporary television
cartoon-series, The Simpsons, parodies TV situation comedy in general while
also satirising middle America.
At the level of common usage, some lack of discrimination between terms
does no harm to audiences or practitioners, even if it offends the sensibilities
of some cultural theorists.
However, while legal definition clearly needs more precision, going to the
opposite extreme and making a binary distinction between parody and satire
as a matter of law is problematic.20 It rests on the assumption that texts can be
definitively sorted into one category or the other, and that is to court empirical
confusion: aliud distinctio, aliud separatio. Indeed, that seems to be exactly
what has happened, if not in Campbell itself then in its subsequent
interpretation.
Prior to Campbell, the status of these artistic practices under US copyright
law was unstable. In Campbell, the copyright owners of the Roy Orbison
song, ‘Pretty Woman’ sued a rap group, 2 Live Crew, over its use of samples21
from the song, in a version with parody lyrics set to a rap beat.
Controversially, the court determined that the rap version was fair use under
s 107. A key factor was the finding that the lyrics of the rap version contained
an implicit criticism of the original song, and could therefore be categorised
as ‘criticism or comment’ and thus within the text of s 107:
For the purposes of copyright law, the nub of the definitions, and the heart of any
parodist’s claim to quote from existing material, is the use of some elements of a
prior author’s composition to create a new one that, at least in part, comments on that
author’s works.22
Despite the majority in Campbell admonishing against ‘bright line rules’ in the
application of s 107, some subsequent lower court applications of Campbell
proceeded to apply a narrow, binary distinction between the two terms which
privileges certain forms of ‘parody’ as presumptively fair over other forms
which are labelled ‘satire’.23 As noted above, it is this approach which was
adopted by various copyright owner groups in submissions to the Australian
Bill consultation process. Despite the fact that the Australian legislature
determined to include ‘satire’ in the new exception in direct contradiction to
the US approach, some copyright owners continue to assert that US judicial
definitions are indeed applicable, particularly in relation to parody.24 If such
definitions were to be unquestioningly adopted in Australia, however, the
20 See further Keller and Tushnet, above n 19; E Gredley and S Maniatis, ‘Parody: A Fatal
Attraction? Part 1: the Nature of Parody and its Treatment in Copyright’ [1997] 7 EIPR 339
at 342–3; Brennan, above n 7, at 166; M Sainsbury, ‘Parody, Satire and Copyright
Infringement: the Latest Addition to Australian Fair Dealing Law’ (2007) 12 MALR 292
at 296.
21 Ie, actual extracts. For more precise definition of this term and discussion, see section 5
below.
22 510 US 569 (1994) at 580.
23 See cases above n 6.
24 Above n 8.
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approach will have the effect of distorting and potentially curtailing the legal
definitions of both parody and satire under the new exception in rather
arbitrary and inconsistent ways.
The US approach would exclude many comic works easily and widely
recognised as parodies because they appropriate, but do not comment in a
directly critical way, upon some original work. This was a crucial point
recognised by the British Law Lords in the early nineteenth century, accepting
that William Hone’s parody of The Bible to satirise his own society was not
blasphemous.25 A more recent example is the adoption during 2007, by
Australian cartoonist Bill Leak, of the character Tintin (from the eponymous
band dessin)26 to represent opposition leader Kevin Rudd. No-one viewing
these cartoons would see them as commenting on the work of the Belgian
artist, Herge´, although the origins of the images are immediately recognisable:
rather, they are a clear, satirical comment on the ebb and flow of Australian
politics. But to forbid the use of the word parody in description of these
cartoons affronts common usage and invites the question — what else is one
supposed to call them?
Another example is provided by the 2007 Ashes tour songs of The Fanatics
(Australian cricket supporters), to which the Attorney-General referred in his
press comments at the time of introducing the amendment.27 While not very
sophisticated, they are recognisable parodies of well-known originals (they
had to be to allow mass audiences to ‘sing-along’ with no rehearsal), and the
Attorney-General recognised as much in using them to illustrate his reasons
for bringing forward the new exception. Taking one case, the song ‘Marcus
Stresscothick’28 is clearly an attack on the English opening batsman of the
time and, by extension, on the mental toughness of the English cricket team,
but it has nothing meaningful to say about the original vehicle, that old rock
and roll standard, ‘Twist and Shout’.
Perhaps it was in recognition of such dangerous waters that the US court
warned in 1994 that ‘bright line rules’ should be avoided, adding the rider that
‘taking parodic aim at an original is a less critical factor’ where other fair use
factors favour the parodist.29 Unfortunately, this thoroughly justified caution
and rider has been ignored in some subsequent cases, and Campbell has been
cited as authority for the requirement that a protected parody must target the
original copyright work by commenting or criticising its substance or style.30
25 For discussion, see Rose, above n 11, p 32, and BWilson, The Laughter of Triumph: William
Hone and the Fight For the Free Press, Faber, London, 2005.
26 Herg was the pen-name of Georges Prosper Remi. Les aventures de Tintin was originally
published in French in 1930, with many series to follow. Some are available electronically
at <http://linux02.lib.cam.ac.uk/~cjs2/vw.cgi?s=WAD+1975.49>. Many of the Leak
cartoons are posted at <http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/gallery/0,25198,5027659-
20581,00.html>.
27 P Ruddock, ‘Protecting Precious Parody’, Daily Telegraph (Sydney), 30 November 2006.
28 Original lyrics to The Beatles’ ‘Twist & Shout’ posted at
<http://www.delta.ro/beatles/lyrics/ptwistand.html>. Parody: ‘Marcus Tresscothick Tune:
Twist & Shout’ posted at <http://www.news.com.au/couriermail/story/0,23739,20643374-
10389,00.html>.
29 Campbell 510 US 569 (1994) at 581 n 14.
30 For criticism of the failure of these subsequent cases (cited above n 6) to adopt the nuances
of the Supreme Court’s analysis in Campbell, see Keller and Tushnet, above n 19; J M
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Casualties of this approach are those parodies that innocently seek only to
entertain (consider Simon Barnes’ cricketing parodies of Proust, Chaucer,
Wild and Ian Fleming et al);31 and those that are paying homage to the
original, so locating themselves in a tradition (consider Tolkien’s entertaining
use of various song forms, or Umberto Eco’s parodic use of the Holmesian
detective story).32 A third would be any parody developed for educational
purposes, to help students identify the salient characteristics of an author’s
style.33 Prior to Campbell, the US courts were prepared to recognise that a
parody could be ‘for humorous effect or commentary’34 provided it otherwise
satisfied the fair use factors. However in Campbell itself, the majority defined
parody as ‘critical wit’, and it is the element of criticism which has since
defined US fair use doctrine on permissible parodies.
US copyright law thus tends to reduce the legal concept of parody to a
convenient shorthand for an activity which literary and cultural theorists
would call ‘lampoon’, whereby the original work is critically ‘targeted’ by
being parodied. As the term is commonly understood and practised, a lampoon
is a subset of parody: it is a parody, the purpose and focus of which is satirical
comment on and ridicule of its original model. As observed above, this is an
uncomfortably narrow definition and would make even the archetypal parody,
Cervantes’ Don Quixote, an uncomfortable fit. The redactors of its original
model, Amadis of Gaul, might, under this interpretation, have some hope of
remedy against the estate of Cervantes for improper use, were it not that so
much time has passed. Lampoons are certainly parodies, but they are only one
of several kinds of parody; others include burlesque, pastiche, travesty and
metafiction,35 as will be discussed further in Part 2 of this article, in the
context of proposing a more defensible ordinary meaning for the term. While
theorists can disagree over the precise borders and subdivisions between these
sometimes overlapping terms, it is clear both from the scholarly literature, and
on any analysis of literary and artistic practice, that parody is the recognised
umbrella term for a range of practices of transformative re-use.36 If the US
Vogel, ‘The Cat In the Hat’s Latest Bad Trick: The Ninth Circuit’s Narrowing of the Parody
Defense to Copyright Infringement in Dr Seuss Enterprises v Penguin Books USA, Inc’
(1998) 20 Cardozo LR 287; E J Schwarz and M Williams, ‘Joking Aside: Recent Copyright
Infringement Cases Re-examine the Distinction between Satire and Parody in Determining
Fair Use’ (2007) 30 Los Angeles Lawyer 33.
31 S Barnes, A La Recherche du Cricket Perdu, Macmillan, London, 1989.
32 U Eco, Il nome della rosa, The Name of the Rose, trans W Weaver, Secker & Warburg,
London, 1983; J R R Tolkein’s parody of the nursery rhyme, ‘The Cow Jumped Over the
Moon’ appears in his The Fellowship of The Ring, Allen & Unwin, London, 1966, Vol 1,
pp 170–2.
33 Eg, A von Aardvark, ‘Recipes and Extracts from the Greatest Chefs in the History of
Political Thought’ (1991) 3(1) The Political Theory Newsletter 97–100.
34 Elsemere 482 F Supp 741; aff 623 252 (2d Cir, 1980) at 252 n 1 (emphasis added).
35 This list is culled from Dentith, above n 11, ‘Definitions’, pp 9–21.
36 J D Jump, Burlesque, Methuen, London, 1972, was idiosyncratic in treating burlesque rather
than parody as the umbrella term. The idea did not catch on, partly because of the
cross-Atlantic differences in the ordinary meaning of burlesque, whereby in the United
States it still tends to designate a saucy stage performance rather than a funny one. Despite
the substantial body of scholarship concerning parody since then, there is a paucity of
mention of burlesque. There is no sense in the parliamentary debates that the Australian
parliament intended to protect only a sub-set of burlesque called parody.
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courts had wanted to protect only lampoon, they really should have said so,
and not employed a word with considerably wider meaning.
Consequently, for US legal commentators, the problem appears to be
twofold: (1) that this test is difficult to apply in practice and is open to
subjective interpretation by the courts; and (2) that the effect of the test is
unnecessarily restrictive of creative expression and free speech.37 For our
purposes, the precedent problem is that this test does not match with meanings
of parody as they are understood among those who produce, analyse and
consume actual parodies in the world beyond the United States, including in
Australia. Despite some US courts endeavouring to take account of both
dictionary definitions and academic literature on the meaning of parody,38 this
legal definition of parody under US law has now evolved its own narrowly
idiosyncratic meaning. Australian courts should not import the US definition
uncritically, even if they seek a restrictive definition of parody for the purposes
of the exception, because it cannot fairly be described as an ‘ordinary
meaning’ of the word in this country, or indeed elsewhere.
4 US fair use definition of ‘satire’
The US legal definition of ‘satire’ for copyright purposes compounds these
difficulties, because it is constrained by its internal logic to find a space for
satire beside and wholly distinct from parody. In reality, satire is very often the
element of intent within a formal glove of parody, and we shall explore this
useful, definitional metaphor at greater length in section 6. To understand fully
the oddness of the US definition, one needs to recognise that while it is
possible either to have pure fist (eg, Juvenal’s Satires)39 or to elaborate an
empty glove (arguably the case of Laurence Sterne’s Tristram Shandy),40 to
separate all parodies and satires into logically distinct piles is impossible
without torturing the meanings of the words. None of this is new or dependent
on transformations available to digital media: Aristophanes’ plays from
classical Athens mix parodic form and satirical purpose; Cervantes’
paradigmatic parody Don Quixote also has clear satirical elements; the
Scriblerian satirists of the eighteenth century, Arbuthnot, Swift41 and Pope, on
whom much of the traditional theory of satire is built, employed sophisticated
37 See, eg, Keller and Tushnet, above n 19; Vogel, above n 30.
38 One might wonder how this somewhat idiosyncratic array of texts was chosen: see, eg,
Campbell 510 US 569 (1994) in which the court referred to the Encyclopedia Brittanica,
1975 ed, the American Heritage Dictionary, 1992 ed, and the Oxford English Dictionary,
1989 ed; Suntrust 268 F 3d 1257 (11th Cir, 2001) whose sources include Rose, above n 11,
V Nabokov, Pale Fire, 1962; and Seuss 109 F 3d 1394 (9th Cir, 1997) which relied on
G Highet, The Anatomy of Satire, 1962.
39 Sixteen verse satires written in the late first and early second centuries CE, translated by,
among others, John Dryden as The Satires of Decimus Junius Juvenalis. Translated into
English Verse by Mr Dryden . . . To which is prefix’d a discourse concerning the original and
progress of satire, Printed for Jacob Tonson at the Judge’s-Head in Chancery-Lane etc,
London, 1693.
40 The Rabelaisian comic novel, originally published in parts between 1759 and 1767; see also
section 6 below.
41 For an extended analysis of how parody and satire co-exist in the works of Jonathan Swift,
see R Phiddian, Swift’s Parody, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge and New York,
1995.
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parodic techniques. The US legal attempt to distinguish as categorically
between parody and satire as one might between apples and oranges, or
between different genera of insects, appears to be little other than a perverse
back-formation from a legal problem and, in consequence, the US legal
definition of ‘satire’ is no closer to being an ‘ordinary definition’ of the term
than that which has emerged for ‘parody’.
The current treatment of satire in US fair use law springs from Campbell,
and it attempts to underpin a somewhat hierarchical separation of the two
terms:
Parody needs to mimic an original to make its point, and so has some claim to use
the creation of its victim’s (or collective victim’s) imagination, whereas satire can
stand on its own two feet and so requires justification for the very act of borrowing.42
The court qualified the statement that satire ‘requires justification for the very
act of borrowing’ with the same rider given on ‘looser forms of parody’: that
is, that where other fair use factors favour the satirist, satire may be found to
be fair use ‘with lesser justification for the borrowing than would otherwise be
required’.43
Post-Campbell courts, however, have used the term ‘satire’ to refer to works
that are determined not to be ‘parodies’ because the target of their criticism is
not the original work. This is despite the fact that it is far from clear that the
court in Campbell intended that all ‘non-qualifying’ parodies be lumped
together as ‘satire’. Souter J refers to satire as ‘a work in which prevalent
follies or vices are assailed with ridicule’ or are ‘attacked through irony,
derision or wit’.44 This does not preclude many works which attack through
parodic means, from Aristophanes to The Simpsons. It is even more difficult
to make a tight distinction between parody and satire where the court goes on
to refer to satire as ‘when society is lampooned through its creative artefacts’.
As noted above, post-Campbell cases have managed to evolve the so-called
binary distinction between the two based on the target of their apparent
criticism or comment. In Suntrust v Houghlin-Mifflin Bank45 the distinction is
expressed as follows:
Parody, which is directed towards a particular literary or artistic work, is
distinguishable from satire, which more broadly addresses the institutions and mores
of a slice of society.46
This seems intuitively plausible until one attempts to apply the distinction in
practice. In that case, the court heard lengthy evidence about whether the
novel The Wind Done Gone was critical of the depiction of slavery in the
original work Gone With the Wind, or merely a general commentary on the
American South in the Civil War era. In another post-Campbell decision, the
42 510 US 569 (1994) at 580–1.
43 Ibid, at 581 n 14.
44 Ibid, at 581 n 15, citing the Oxford English Dictionary, 1992, and American Heritage
Dictionary, 1989, respectively.
45 268 F 3d 1257 (11th Cir, 2001).
46 Ibid, at 1268.
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distinction was expressed as: ‘parody (in which the copyrighted work is the
target) and satire, (in which the copyrighted work is merely a vehicle to poke
fun at another target).’47
It can be seen that the definitions of satire in these cases range from narrow
to broad descriptions of both targets and modes. The narrow formulation is
redolent of a rather forced understanding of Augustan satire: this was in fact
highly parodic, because literary and intellectual follies were held to be central
to ‘social follies’more generally.48 In the broader formulation, the copyrighted
work is a vehicle to ‘poke fun at another target’. To some extent the formula
has not mattered much — in these cases as ‘satire’ has functioned as a
catch-all, negative category which is presumptively disqualified from fair use
because it has unfairly borrowed some of its materials. As one academic paper
has noted,49 however, the result of Campbell has been for comedians and
others to stop calling their work ‘satire’ and start to call them ‘parodies’.
A US musician has cynically commented that he can only avoid infringement
for changing the lyrics to a popular song if he includes a verse targeting the
song’s copyright owner — by complaining about her refusal to licence a
parody.50
While there may be legal convenience in having a neat binary distinction
between fair (parody) and unfair (satire) use, the artistic practices and odd
development of US law in this area both demonstrate that this is not really
tenable.51 Indeed, there are signs that this is being recognised in the United
States. In a recent case, the US Court of Appeals found that a ‘satire’ was fair,
applying the s 107 fair use factors to a Jeff Koons collage entitled ‘Easyfun
Ethereal’.52 The Koons work, like many in the digital age now upon us,
incorporated a scanned partial reproduction of a photograph of glamorous
female legs. The photograph, which Koons said he used because it was a
‘typical’ image of women’s legs ‘in our consumer culture’, was a Gucci
magazine advertisement byAndrea Blanch, a commercial photographer. In the
Koons collage, the partial reproduction of the photograph is surrounded by
painted images of a landscape with giant pastries and sweets. In court, Koons
gave evidence that he intended to:
comment on the ways in which some of our most basic appetites — for food, play,
and sex — are mediated by popular images . . . By reconceptualizing these
fragments as I do, I try to compel the viewer to break out of the conventional way
of experiencing a particular appetite as mediated by mass media.53
The court held that Koons had a ‘genuine creative rationale’ for using the
Blanch image in order to ‘satirize’. Applying the fair use analysis required
under s 107, the court found that Koons had sufficiently justified sampling
Blanch’s photograph. While the decision is of little consolation to commercial
photographers, importantly it opens the door for various strands of
47 Seuss 109 F 3d 1394 (9th Cir, 1997) at 1400.
48 As for example in Swift’s Battle of the Books, 1697, Pope’s Dunciad, 1728–43, Pope and
Arbuthnot’s Peri Bathous, 1727; and ubiquitously the ‘ancients and moderns’ disputes.
49 Keller and Tushnet, above n 19, at 992.
50 Mike Agranoff, posted at <http://www.mikeagranoff.com/lyrics/PlayTheGuitar.htm>.
51 Keller and Tushnet, above n 19, at 994–5; Vogel, above n 30; cf Brennan, above n 7, at 167.
52 Blanch v Koons 467 F 3d 244 (2d Cir, 2006).
53 Ibid, at 247.
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post-modernist artistic practice to qualify as fair use. With the explosion in the
capacity of digital media in recent decades, this sort of visual or sonic
appropriation is most likely to generate the difficult cases for judicial attention,
in Australia as much as the United States.
Since, as stated above, the inclusion of ‘satire’ in the new Australian
exception seems expressly designed to avoid this post-Campbell distinction
and to protect uses of copyright material for wider aims than simply
lampooning the original work, it would be unfortunate if the outdated US
approach were imported via the back door. It seems clear that the Australian
legislature intended that both parody and satire in their ordinary meanings
should be presumptively capable of protection in relation to use of copyright
material, provided that use is ‘fair’. The question of fairness should be judged
separately from the question of what constitutes parody or satire.
5 Limitations of dictionary definitions
It is worth noting, initially, that the purposes of dictionaries have changed
significantly over the last hundred years or so, and with them the types of
definition attempted. Before the development of the New English Dictionary
on Historical Principles (commonly know as the Oxford English Dictionary
or OED) in the nineteenth century, dictionaries were highly selective and their
definitions frequently stipulative and prospective. Concentrating on new,
foreign and difficult words, they sought to control present and future use. The
OED, in keeping with the development of philology, broke with a long
tradition in attempting to be complete and historical. It was agnostic as to
future and preferred uses, its definitions ideally being purely lexical,
abridgments from patterns of de facto use and including previous patterns of
change where possible (hence the inclusion of the obsolete). The necessary
correlative of this comprehensive ambition was a degree of time-lag in
cataloguing the semantic development of language. The Macquarie
Dictionary is in the same idiom as the OED and, as we shall see, significantly
dependent on it.
In Australian jurisprudence, the Macquarie Dictionary has been the
preferred dictionary reference assisting courts in the task of construing
ordinary words. In De Garis v Neville Jeffresse Pidler,54 Beaumont J relied
upon it as the sole dictionary source in determining the meaning of the
common words such as ‘criticism’, ‘review’ and ‘news’, used in the various
fair dealing defences relevant to the case, as did the trial judge and appeal
court in the ‘Panel’ case, discussed below.55 In the rare instances of obiter
dicta in which the terms ‘parody’ or ‘satire’ have been considered inAustralian
copyright law to date, the Macquarie is featured once again.56
54 (1990) 37 FCR 99; 18 IPR 292; 95 ALR 625.
55 Panel trial judgment (2001) 184 ALR 1; 50 IPR 335; [2001] FCA 108; BC200100361;
(appeal) (2002) 190 ALR 468; 55 IPR 112; [2002] FCAFC 146; BC200202565. The
selective use of the Macquarie Dictionary in these cases is criticised by M Handler and
D Rolph, ‘A Real Pea Souper: The Panel Case and the Development of the Fair Dealing
Defences to Copyright Infringement in Australia’ (2003) 27(2) MULR 381, text
accompanying nn 105–113.
56 Cases cited above n 16.
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We turn now to consider how closely, in our view, the Macquarie
Dictionary definitions of parody and satire approximate ordinary,
contemporary meanings. The compilation history of the Macquarie, and
behind that, of the OED, suggests that these definitions may not be the most
appropriate for current legal purposes, given the purpose and objects of the
legislation. They are relatively old definitions, based almost entirely on
literary conceptions of parody and satire.57 Moreover, the taxonomic practice
of alphabetical listing can reinforce the impression that satire and parody are
indeed as neatly separable as they might be formally distinguishable. While
they are competent in their own terms, it is questionable whether these
definitions provide a sufficient basis for twenty-first century delineation of
what are restlessly evolving critical and artistic forms, especially in the light
of developments in digital technology. This limits their value as ‘ordinary
meaning’ definitions for the purposes of the new exception.
The definitions of both terms in the current online version of theMacquarie
are:
parody noun (plural parodies)
1. a humorous or satirical imitation of a serious piece of literature or writing.
2. the kind of literary composition represented by such imitations.
3. a burlesque imitation of a musical composition.
4. a poor imitation; a travesty.
verb (t) (parodied, parodying)
5. to imitate (a composition, author, etc) in such a way as to ridicule.
6. to imitate poorly. [Latin parodia, from Greek paroidia burlesque poem]
— parodist, noun58
satire noun
1. the use of irony, sarcasm, ridicule, etc, in exposing, denouncing, or deriding
vice, folly, etc.
2. a literary composition, in verse or prose, in which vices, abuses, follies, etc,
are held up to scorn, derision, or ridicule.
3. the species of literature constituted by such composition. [Latin satira,
variant of satura medley, properly feminine of satur full, sated]59
57 These conceptions should be understood against a broader literary bias in the OED. When
it was compiled, earliest use was typically sought in what are now literary texts, because
these were available; hence there is a sometimes misleading literary authority that pervades
construction and the perceived development of the English language. See R W McConchi,
‘Wise and Learned Cunctation: Medical Terminology 1547-1612 and the OED’,
Dictionaries, Vol 5, 1983, pp 22–35.
58 Macquarie Dictionary Publishers Pty Ltd, Bibliography: The Macquarie Dictionary Online,
2007, at <http://www.macquariedictionary.com.au/129.96.0.0.16@FF839406088/-/p/dict/
article_display.html?type=title&first=1&mid=2&last=2&current=1&result=1&DatabaseList
=dictbigmac&query=parody&searchType=findrank>.
59 Macquarie Dictionary Publishers Pty Ltd, ‘Bibliography’, The Macquarie Dictionary
Online, 2007, at <http://www.macquariedictionary.com.au/129.96.0.0.16@FF839406088/-
/p/dict/article_display.html?type=title&first=1&mid=2&last=2&current=1&result=1&Data
baseList=dictbigmac&query=satire&searchType=findrank>.
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It should be noted that each of these definitions is identical with those in the
first edition of 1981.60 For a dictionary, this is not scandalous. Defining words
is a precise art, so revision is something to be undertaken carefully and rarely;
routine revision will cause more trouble than it avoids. Nor is it
lexicographically unreasonable that the 1981 Macquarie definitions are
demonstrably (in both structure and content of definitions) based on the
definitions in the original OED (published in fascicles starting at A from 1884
and available in a complete edition in 1933). Dictionaries winnow
interpretations over time, and a new dictionary (as the Macquarie was in
1981) will legitimately use the major authority in the field as a resource. The
definitions in the 1933 OED are:
Parody sb.1
1. A composition in prose or verse in which the characteristic turns of thought
and phrase in an author or class of authors are imitated in such a way as to
make them appear ridiculous, especially by applying them to ludicrously
inappropriate subjects; an imitation of a work more or less closely modelled
on the original, but so turned as to produce a ridiculous effect. Also applied
to a burlesque of a musical work.
2. transf and fig. A poor or feeble imitation, a travesty.
Parody v.
1. a. trans. To compose a parody on (a work or author); to turn into a parody;
to ridicule (a composition) by imitating it.
b. intr. To write or compose a parody
2. trans. In a general sense: To imitate in a way that is no better than a parody.61
Satire
1. a. A poem, or in modern use sometimes a prose composition, in which
prevailing vices or follies are held up to ridicule. Sometimes, less correctly,
applied to a composition in verse or prose intended to ridicule a particular
person or class of persons, a lampoon.
b. transf. A satirical utterance; a speech or saying in ridicule of some person
or thing. Obs.
c. fig. A thing, fact, or circumstance that has the effect of making some person
or thing ridiculous.
2. a. The species of literature constituted by satires; satirical composition.
b. The employment, in speaking or writing, of sarcasm, irony, ridicule, etc in
exposing, denouncing, deriding, or ridiculing vice, folly, indecorum, abuses,
or evils of any kind.
3. Satirical temper, disposition to use ‘satire’.62
Clearly, the Macquarie definitions derive directly from the OED’s. They are
sometimes in a different order of exposition and they vary the precise order of
words, but they do not differ from them in substance. They are adequate
definitions for a general dictionary, but our point is that they cannot have taken
60 The Macquarie Dictionary, St Leonards, NSW: Macquarie Library, 1981, pp 1260, 1531.
61 The Oxford English Dictionary, Being a Corrected Re-Issue with an Introduction,
Supplement, and Bibliography of A New English Dictionary on Historical Principles,
Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1933, Vol VII, p 489 (illustrative quotations omitted).
62 OED, Vol IX, pp 119–20. We have omitted the illustrative quotations and definitions 2c and
2d which add nothing material to the discussion.
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into account any developments in the theory or practice of parody and satire
since P and S were published in fascicles during the 1920s. Interestingly, the
online edition of the OED recognises that there may be a need for
modernisation, at least with ‘parody’, for which it provides a draft revision of
the definition from 2005 onwards. This draft definition reduces the emphasis
on ridicule, notes a particular but not compulsory link with satire, and extends
the range of artistic fields potentially included:
A literary composition modelled on and imitating another work, esp a composition
in which the characteristic style and themes of a particular author or genre are
satirized by being applied to inappropriate or unlikely subjects, or are otherwise
exaggerated for comic effect. In later use extended to similar imitations in other
artistic fields, as music, painting, film, etc.63
It follows that if Australian courts depend on the Macquarie for an
understanding of these words, they are relying on lexicographic work
completed shortly after World War I, and decades before the advent even of
The Goon Show. At least on the face of it, this presents a problem, for very
substantial changes have occurred in the media of parody and satire through
the development of film, radio and television during the twentieth century, as
well as a further level of transformation derived from the more recent arrival
of the digital age. Television in particular, from That Was The Week That Was
(TW3)64 in the 1960s to The Panel65 and The Chaser’s War on Everything66 in
the last few years, has created a mass media satiric/parodic/news genre (yet to
find an elegant name) that is developing its own traditions and blurring once
distinct practices.67 Such developments reflect post-modern tendencies for
communication to play with multiple levels of ambiguity and receding
perspectives; to borrow or adapt material or forms (including via technical
means such as slowing down/speeding up film, familiar from silent movies,
Funniest Home Videos etc); to present and replay ‘live’ (ie, rehearsed but also
semi-unstaged) performances in hoax or stunt form such as Candid Camera or
The Chaser. In the United States, The Daily Show insists that it be satirical in
its news coverage, as only satire can give full coverage of the news
63 Oxford English Dictionary Online, ‘Parody, n.2’ (draft revision June 2005), at
<http://dictionary.oed.com/>.
64 Pioneering BBC Television satirical commentary on politics and world events, broadcast in
1962 and 1963, with David Frost as comp re.
65 Network Ten and affiliates talk show, 1998–2000 and occasional specials, produced by
Working Dog Productions, included several members of the former D-Generation and The
Late Show casts.
66 The ABC’s recent Chaser program. The Chaser team describe themselves as ‘a satirical
media empire which rivals Rupert Murdochs News Corp in all fields except power,
influence, popularity and profitability’: MySpace at
<http://www.myspace.com/chaserteam>.
67 Consider also Not the Nine O’Clock News (BBC), Drop The Dead Donkey (SBS), and The
Daily Show (US); and cf Yes Minister (all episodes based on real cases and including
accurate statistics), Frontline, and during the Sydney Olympics preparations, The Games.
For print examples, see The Onion, Three Rivers Press, New York; columns by Edward
Pearce in the UK Daily Telegraph during the Maggie Thatcher period, which were satirical
reports of parliamentary proceedings, enlivened with playful comments on the Prime
Minister’s dress-style; and the now defunct The Chaser Magazine, replaced by the current
Chaser website, with redaction of the latter’s headlines in the main news-section of The
Weekend Australian.
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(a post-modern twist on the old newspaper claim of constituting ‘all the news
that’s fit to print’). Such claims are taken seriously by a new-generation
audience that is media-literate and logs onto the internet for news and
information.
None of these examples fit comfortably in the old literary taxonomies of the
dictionary definitions quoted above, which assume that parody and satire are
primarily literary activities. Even the OED’s draft revision retains ‘literary
composition’ as primary. Indeed, the ghost in the machine (the DNA) of the
‘satire’ definitions is the narrow generic definition which confines it to
discursive poems like those of Horace, Juvenal and Pope. This is the sort of
formal verse-satire that Quintilian had in mind in the first century CE, when
he wrote proudly of the one verse genre not inherited by the Romans from the
Greeks, ‘satura quidem tota nostra est’.68 Cognisant of the limitations of this
very old source, both the Macquarie and the OED feel a need to include the
possibility of ‘and prose’ as also a valid medium so as to ensure that, for
example, Swift’s famous work is not excluded. It is revealing that the OED’s
first definition, however, is this narrower one, and only the second definition
is more expansive; the Macquarie at least puts the broader definition first and
the narrower second.
Reading the definitions narrowly also excludes from purview both satirical
drama (a considerable tradition from Aristophanes to Ayckbourn, Williamson
and beyond), and satiric opera (eg, The Marriage of Figaro, even Gilbert and
Sullivan); even political cartoons in newspapers would miss the cut. Neither
definition is useful in addressing that most common of satirical features today
— and one to which the Attorney-General drew the attention of parliament —
satire in visual media. Both definitions assume that the essential form of satire
is written or spoken words. Even the definitions of parody, while allowing for
the notion of musical parody as an example, are otherwise overwhelmingly
verbal in focus. As we have demonstrated, this is an incomplete version of the
world in which artists and their audiences work and live today.
Naturally, literary parody and satire still occur and deserve the protection of
the new fair use provisions in copyright. But these areas are unlikely to
present a major problem for courts in practice because they are
long-established cultural activities, the ground-rules of which are well
understood (in general) by writers, audiences and targets. The most volatile
area in parody and satire — as exemplified by the US cases discussed above
and particularly Blanch v Koons and other Australian cases such as The Panel
— is presently in visual and digital media. It is here that the need will be
greatest for legally sound definitions of the terms that take such cultural
practices and new ordinary meanings into account.
The clearest way of illustrating the problem in using definitions stemming
directly from 1981 and indirectly from the 1920s is to look at how the
meaning of the word ‘sampling’ has changed in editions of the Macquarie.
Sampling is, of course, the word in common usage for the most common
digital practice of audiovisual re-use and recombination. It is now defined:
Sampling
68 Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria, 10.1.93: ‘Satire indeed is entirely our own’.
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noun 1. a technique of digitally encoding external sounds and reproducing them
at different pitches.
2. the process of creating a new piece of music by combining various extracts
from other artists’ songs, musical pieces, etc.
— adjective 3. (of synthesisers) having the facility to digitally encode external
sounds and reproduce them at different pitches.
4. of or relating to someone who records music which consists of a composite of
other artists’ recordings.69
In 1981, the point of origin for the dictionary definitions of parody and satire
being used by courts at present, there was no separate definition of ‘sampling’,
for the obvious reason that it was not then technologically possible, except in
a handful of laboratories. Instead, the word was subsumed within a definition
of ‘sample’, grounded principally in statistics:
Sample, n, adj, v, -pled, -pling,
-n. 1. a small part of anything or one of a number, intended to show the quality,
style, etc, of the whole; a specimen.
— adj. 2. serving as a specimen: a sample copy,
-vt. 3. to take a sample or samples of; test or judge by a sample.70
It is possible to see how a word thus understood could be extended to include
digital sampling, but clearly this definition did not see such an extension
coming. Even if the intellectual work in the Macquarie definitions of parody
and satire is dated to the first edition of the dictionary (rather than the
progenitor definitions in the OED), it is clear that they were arrived at in a
world which had no premonition of what has now become one of the dominant
cultural practices of early twenty-first century satirical and parodic re-use.
Thus courts would be unwise to rely on lexicography that could not anticipate
the advent of such practices of digital re-use. For the sorts of hard cases that
are most likely to end up in court it is important that theMacquarie definitions
should not be used in a manner that assumes they anticipate future uses of the
terms.
This is, of course, a fundamental issue with using modern dictionaries for
definitions. As we have indicated, they do not prescribe the semantic range of
a word prospectively: rather they map usage, and they do so retrospectively.
This can provide good, well-researched evidence for what ordinary usage has
been at a point in the past (not always, or even often, the date of publication
of the dictionary), but it is only a map. There are varying degrees of time-lag
between definition (semantic content) and the pragmatics of use. Rarely can
dictionaries take into account the evanescence of the forms of slang which
differentiate social groups and which can be a vital factor in current use.
Sensibly, in order to maintain their formal relevance, they opt for definitions
of open-ended generality with apposite and clarifying illustration; but neither
the general mapping of meaning, nor the illustration is legislative; nor can
they be if they are to withstand the vagaries of time. Dictionary definitions are
useful but not the end of the argument, especially where culturally and
formally dynamic activities like parody and satire are concerned.
69 Macquarie Dictionary Publishers Pty Ltd, The Macquarie Dictionary Online, 2007.
70 Macquarie Dictionary, 1981, p 1525.
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Supplementary definition for these terms in particular needs to be carefully
considered.
These observations suggest that courts reviewing the new exception may
need to go beyond the heavy favouring of the Macquarie Dictionary
demonstrated in fair dealing cases to date. At a minimum, it would be
preferable that a range of dictionaries be consulted, and then supplemented
with other sources against the context of use.71As parody and satire are terms
whose usage reflects changing stylistic practice by artists, it may be more
useful to be guided by the approach taken in other areas of copyright law
concerning artistic matters, where the difficulty of judging aesthetic issues is
more readily acknowledged. Here courts are often more receptive to the
opinions of practitioners, industry experts and even of the creators themselves
in coming to an objective view of the legal issue at hand. A pertinent example
is the decision of Tamberlin J in Schott Musik International GMBH v Colossal
Records of Australia,72 a copyright case which considered whether a ‘techno’
version of Carl Orff’s Carmina Burana was a ‘debasement’ of the original. In
determining this question, the judge considered a range of dictionary
definitions of the term ‘debasement’ stating:
The dictionary definitions are not conclusive but they are of some assistance . . . In
my view, the appropriate approach is to consider the various lines of definition, and
balance them with the evidence, legislative history and other relevant matters.73
Accordingly, Tamberlin J took judicial notice of the then contemporary ‘rave’
culture in which techno music was played, and heard from industry
practitioners and musicologists as expert witnesses. His approach mirrors that
of some US courts considering the meaning of parody who have accepted
testimony from experts, and even artists themselves.74 It is also common for
experts to be used to assist Australian courts in other areas of intellectual
property litigation.75 There is no reason why a consideration of the meaning
of the terms ‘parody’ and ‘satire’ concerning, as they do, matters of aesthetics,
could not encompass this broader and more flexible approach to statutory
interpretation of these words as they apply in particular industries and artistic
contexts.
In Part 2 of this article, we will hazard some suggestions as to how that
supplementation should proceed in order to reflect the points of view of those who
create, study and appreciate today’s humour in parody and satire.
71 See Pearce and Geddes, above n 9, citing Falconer v Pedersen [1974] VR 185 at 187: ‘One
must interpret the phrase as used in its context, assisted as it may be, but not necessarily
bound, by one of a variety of dictionary definitions.’
72 (1996) 71 FCR 37; 141 ALR 433; 36 IPR 267; BC9605718; affirmed on appeal: (1997) 75
FCR 321; 145 ALR 483; 38 IPR 1; BC9702546.
73 Ibid, trial judgment, at IPR 9.
74 See eg, Suntrust 268 F 3d 1257 (11th Cir, 2001); Blanch v Koons 467 F 3d 244 (2d Cir,
2006).
75 See eg, Sheldon v Metrokane (2004) 61 IPR 1; [2004] FCA 19; BC200400149, and also see
Sainsbury, above n 20, at 317–18, suggesting that experts and academic writings could be
used to assist the court in considering the new exception.
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